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This paper examines the effectiveness of the EU’s use of trade to inducing peace in Libya 
during Gaddafi’s final ten years in power, between 2001 and 2011. During this period, the 
EU implored and reiterated through rhetoric, policy and the exchange of goods and services 
that trade was to be used as a tool to maintain peace and prevent conflict. However, this 
paper identifies how this EU policy flopped, specifically due to the policy’s failure to take into 
account the Libyan context, specifically: the Middle Eastern state’s ethnographic and 
historical makeup, WMD program induced sanctions, Gaddafi’s rule and the 2011 conflict, 









Since its foundation in 1951, the European Union (EU) has believed that economic 
integration leads to peace. This ethos, declared by the French Foreign Minister and one of 
the founding fathers of the EU, Robert Schuman on May 9, 1950 is based on the notion that 
the pooling and free flow of resources eliminates the potential for conflict.1 This peace-
through-trade idea was initially concerned with inter-EU member state ties and was then 
extrapolated to include extra-EU member state relations.2 In practice however, this policy 
has not always been successful. In order to assess this EU peace-through-trade-policy, this 
paper adopts a case study analysis of EU-Libyan ties between 2001 and 2011. This novel 
approach of assessing EU-Libyan ties during this timeframe sheds light on how the historical 
makeup of Libya, Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) and sanctions, Muammar 
Gaddafi’s rule and the 2011 conflict led to a failure of the policy. 
This study focuses on this period as it marks a particularly low point in the total value of EU-
Libyan trade (at $13.12 billion in 2001), notably even lower than the corresponding figure 
during the 2011 conflict ($17.45 billion). 3  Further, this study captures the 2003 Libyan 
decision to roll back the WMD program, leading to a respite in sanctions against Tripoli and 
a growing EU-Libyan trade trajectory as a result – a positive development for the peace-
through-trade-policy. This paper ends its analysis in 2011 following the removal of the Libyan 
Leader, Gaddafi. As a result, this paper contributes to the understanding of how and why, in 
spite of the EU’s peace-through-trade-policy and the softening Libyan stance, this EU policy 
failed in this case. Furthermore, this study also provides some reflections as to what this 
means for the peace-through-trade relationship in general. 
During the timeframe concerned, the EU implemented the 2004 European Neighborhood 
Policy (ENP) which aimed to improve political and economic relations with Mediterranean 
states, including Libya.4 Additionally, EU-Libyan ties were under the remit of the 1995-08 
Barcelona Process, which further emphasized the benefits of economic integration between 
the EU and its neighbors. 5  Then in 2008, the Barcelona Process developed into the 
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European-Mediterranean Agreement (EUROMED),6 with Libya being an ‘observer’ of this 
framework, 7  referred to as the 1995/2008 EUROMED henceforth. Further, the 1993 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)8 was consolidated into the 2010 European 
External Action Service (EEAS), which also promoted the EU’s peace-through-trade-policy 
towards foreign actors.9 
Libya also signed the 2008 EU-Libyan Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) during this 
timeframe.10 Further, amidst the 2008 global recession, Libya refreshed the MoU and the 
2010 Migration Cooperation Agenda (MCA).11 In 2011, the protests and Libyan conflict which 
led to the death of Gaddafi,12 resulted in a fall in EU-Libyan trade with Libyan imports hitting 
$2.91 billion (the lowest level since 2001) and exports dipping to $14.54 (the lowest since 
2003).13 
Specifically, this study examines how the EU was unable to account for the environment in 
which it implemented the peace-through-trade-policy and demonstrates how the policy failed 
in this case. It does so by initially tracking the foundation and development of the EU’s 
peace-through-trade-policy, the Libyan context, the impact of the 1996 United States of 
America’s (US) Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA), Gaddafi’s WMD program, the 
1995/2008 EUROMED, 2004 ENP and the 2011 unrest. It is important to note that US policy 
towards Libya also impacted the EU’s peace-through-trade-policy in this case. As a result, 
the US role and its impact on the EU’s policy is highlighted throughout this paper. 
For the purpose of this study, trade is measured by analyzing recorded EU-Libyan import 
and export levels in this period.14 It is worth noting that these figures are published by the EU 
as an aggregation of European member state-Libyan trade levels. This indicates that this 
trade was carried out on a country-country (EU member-Libya) basis as opposed to a union-
country (EU-Libya) basis. Therefore, EU member interests are what drove these trade 
transactions with Libya. Further, one of the main criticisms of the EU’s inability to adopt a 
coherent foreign policy in this period was the internal rivalries between member states and 
EU institutional (European Parliament, European Council and European Commission) 
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interests. However, the focus of this paper is to identify why recorded EU-Libyan trade was 
unable to prevent conflict in Libya. Thus, for the purpose of this paper, the aggregated EU 
member trade levels with Libya (2001-11) represented the EU-Libyan trade relationship. 
Finally, this paper assesses the competence of the EU’s peace-through-trade-policy. 
Therefore, its definition of peace is taken from the EU’s policy itself. Specifically, the EU 
identifies that peace will ensue once barriers preventing its realization are removed. This 
includes non-proliferation of WMDs, 15  support for terrorist groups, 16  political and public 
freedom of expression and assembly and an end to civil conflict.17 This paper defines Libya 
in a state of peace when the listed EU barriers are removed. It follows that if the EU was 
able to alleviate these peace concerns through trade, then it would have achieved peace in 
Libya. As a result, this study identifies the reasons for this policy failure and provides points 
to consider in order to facilitate peace-through-trade-policy success in the future. Namely the 
need to consider the political environment in which it is operating. The theoretical 
foundations of the trade-peace relationship are explored in the following section. 
Peace-Through-Trade Literature 
Before addressing the debate between trade and peace, it is important to define the key 
terms. Rather unambiguously, ‘trade’ is defined as the exchange of goods and services, and 
this study focuses on public and private sector 2001-11 EU-Libyan trade. The term ‘peace’ 
on the other hand requires more clarification. 
As noted in the introduction, this work uses the EU policy’s definition, i.e. the removal of 
barriers to peace, to test the peace-through-trade-policy. This definition is grounded in 
literature in the field. Notably, Hobbes determined that in order for two actors to be at peace 
they must act ‘towards each other as they would allow for against themselves’.18 Galtung 
also noted that in order for a country to be in a state of peace, there must be an agreement 
to do so.19 That being said, it is possible for conflict to take place when peace agreements 
are active. Further, Bercovitch and Jackson define conflict as ‘a perception of incompatibility 
between two or more actors and the range of behavior associated with such perceptions’.20 
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The ‘perceptions’ here are very broad by nature and it is therefore necessary to focus this 
definition. By adapting and refining these definitions, this study operates under the 
assumption that Libya is in a state of peace/not in a state of conflict if it is pursuing the EU’s 
stated strategies which prevent peace, including being involved in civil conflict. 
Broadly speaking, there are two main sides to the peace-through-trade literature debate, one 
which asserts that the two variables are positively correlated and the other posits the 
opposite.21 The former is generally considered to be operating under the liberal positive-sum 
assumption, which attributes a positive outcome to increased state interaction (in the form of 
trade in this case). Whilst the latter operates under the realist zero-sum rule, concerned with 
the conservative nature of inter-state trade and fosters an environment of competition 
between the actors involved so that they can maximize their trade surplus with one 
another.22 
Specifically, these theoretical standpoints operate under a different set of assumptions as to 
how the mechanisms of the trade-peace relationship operate. As Barbieri and Schneider 
note, from the liberal positive-sum perspective, the ‘increased contact associated with 
greater trade ties promotes peace and unifies states’.23 This is borne out of the assumption 
put forward by Smith that when two actors trade with one another, they benefit from mutual 
‘enrichment’.24 Therefore, the EU is concerned with this ‘increased contact’ through trade, 
which in turn leads to mutual benefits, in the form of peace in this instance. 
Conversely, the realist zero-sum approach as summarized by Schneider, Barbieri and 
Gleditsch, denotes that the prospect of ‘feeding a potential enemy through the intensification 
of trade is the major impediment to any attempt to create lasting … trade relations between 
nonaligned states’.25 This notion is entrenched in the assumption that an increase in trade 
results in the asymmetric distribution of gains. This results in what Hocking and McGuire 
describe as one country attaining a ‘surplus’ and therefore being a ‘winner’, whilst the other 
country’s resultant ‘deficit’ makes it a ‘loser’ in the trade relationship. 26 
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This relationship has been put to the test by previous studies which demonstrate how the 
peace-through-trade-policy has a positive correlation. 27  Specifically, Kinnie assessed the 
impact that third party actors had on conflict between two states, which share trade ties with 
the same third party. Kinnie concluded that a potential instigator of conflict ‘lowers its 
likelihood of using force’ as trade rises between itself and the third party. 28  Kinnie’s 
observation is based on the fact that the third party and potential instigator’s trade ties 
provide an ‘avenue of influence: by threatening actions or policies that endanger this tie 
[such as…] sanctions, quotas, embargoes, seizures, blockades, etc’. 29  However, this 
conclusion was based on the Correlates Of War (COW) database to measure peace,30 which 
records instances of conflict. The problem with using this type of information to measure 
peace is that it provides a snapshot of the environment concerned and fails to take into 
account the context (i.e. the historical makeup of the country or the existence of peace 
agreements during times of conflict). As a result it is necessary to include a qualitative 
analysis of these factors in order to gain a better understanding of the peace-through-trade 
relationship in general and the causes of conflict in particular. Gartzke’s study also finds that 
trade and peace have a positive relationship as he determined that a liberal economy (and 
increased trade) ‘lead nations closer together [and…] down grade historic territorial 
animosities’.31 
On the other side of the debate, scholars have purported a negative correlation between 
trade and peace.32 For example, Reuveny argued that the asymmetry of trade between 
Israel and Palestine warrant the need for economic separation (which extends to limiting 
trade).33 However, Reuveny does not take into account the fact that historical grievances 
between Israel and Palestine are deeply entrenched in this case. As a result, an economic 
policy designed to ameliorate conflict between the two actors must overcome the historical 
contextual barriers when considering the link between trade and peace. Similarly Barbieri 
comes to the same conclusion using the COW database. The issue once more with 
Barbieri’s measure for peace is not only that it records instances of conflict, such as threats, 
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displays and use of military force,34 but it fails to take into account non-military force which 
may lead to conflict. Therefore it is necessary to account for the context as well as the type 
of conflict when determining the peace-through-trade correlation of a given case. 
On the issue of regime types, Gasiorowski and Polachek’s study, in the context of East-West 
ties during the Cold War, found that increased trade and interdependence had a positive 
impact on ameliorating conflict.35 Additionally, Barbieri’s work identifies that the proponents 
of the peace-through-trade policy contend that trade is ‘a means to overcome regime, 
cultural, and other national divisions’. 36  The remit of this paper is such that whilst it is 
implicitly concerned with this ‘regime type’ aspect of the trade-peace literature, it is primarily 
focused on the impact of trade on peace, no matter what the circumstance (see the EU’s 
peace-through-trade-policy for detail). Therefore, its conclusions are solely focused on the 
trade-peace element in the literature, in the hope that future studies will center their attention 
on the ‘regime type’ aspect. 
In order to overcome these issues, this study combines a qualitative analysis (of the political 
developments which took place in the period concerned) whilst incorporating quantitative 
data (i.e. EU-Libyan trade levels). As a result, the argument integrates the context into its 
analysis by examining the political and economic developments which prevented EU trade 
from leading to peace in 2001-11 Libya. 
The EU’s Peace-through-trade-policy 
The EU’s belief in the peace-through-trade relationship is fundamental to its foundation. 
Indeed, Schuman’s 1950 declaration was made with reference to Franco-German 
competition over coal and steel, something he identified as being a source of conflict 
between the two powers.37 This vision was born under the EU’s 1951 Paris Treaty, which: 
Resolved to substitute for age-old rivals [France and Germany] the merging of their essential 
interests; to create, by establishing an economic community, the basis for a broader and 
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deeper community among peoples long divided by bloody conflicts; and to lay the 
foundations for institutions which will give direction to a destiny henceforth shared.38 
This idea of a shared destiny progressed under the 1957 Rome Treaty when member states 
were instructed to work together to maintain international peace and security.39 However, 
with regards to foreign policy making, the member states still lacked a united banner under 
which to operate. This drove the need to establish, under the 1970 European Political 
Cooperation policy (EPC), a: 
Common conviction that a Europe composed of States [..] are united in their 
essential interests […] conscious of the role it [EU] has to play in promoting the 
relaxation of international tension and the rapprochement among all peoples […] is 
indispensable if a mainspring of […] peace is to be preserved.40 
This idea of a common conviction to establish a united foreign policy to preserve peace 
remained in place until the 1992 Maastricht Treaty introduced the CFSP to establish 
‘systemic cooperation between member states in the conduct of policy’, under the EU 
provisions, which include the principle of economic integration. 41  The CFSP was then 
consolidated under the EEAS in 2010 to ensure that member states were consistent in their 
external action.42 
The EU also had two instruments running alongside its foreign policy mechanism which 
concerned Libya, the 1995/2008 EUROMED and the 2004 ENP. Both of which implored the 
use of trade to preserve peace.43 However, the fact that Libya was not fully integrated into 
the ENP44 or the EUROMED,45 meant that the EU’s peace-through-trade-policy was unable 
to reach its goal in the context of these two instruments. 
It is also important to clarify that the EU’s peace-through-trade-policy was adopted in this 
case, in spite of pressure from other actors, i.e. the US (as detailed in this paper). 
Additionally, the EU’s policy is adopted no matter what the context is, i.e. whether a country 
is involved in conflict or the type of regime it is dealing with. A useful comparative example of 
this is the case of EU-Israeli ties where the EU’s peace-through-trade-policy was 
systematically adopted when interacting with Israel. Specifically, during the 2008-09 
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Operation Cast Lead Conflict, an estimated 1,400 Palestinians and 13 Israelis were killed,46 
demonstrating, among other developments, the lack of peace in this case. Additionally, 
whilst the conflict led to the upgrading of EU-Israeli ties being put on hold,47  the 2000 
Association Agreement between the two actors remained in place. This agreement re-
asserted the EU’s intentions of promoting peace, security and cohesion in the region and 
repeated the EU’s dedication to the peace-through-trade-policy. 48  This not only 
demonstrates the EU’s dedication to the policy but also its failure to take into account the 
context in which it is being implemented. 
In other words, the EU’s peace-through-trade-policy aims to achieve its goal with a trade 
partner, regardless of; the influence of other actors in the country in question, whether the 
country in question is in a state of peace or the type of regime it is dealing with. As a result, 
this demonstrates the EU’s almost blind dedication to the peace-through-trade-policy. 
The Libyan Context 
The main argument of this paper is that the EU’s peace-through-trade-policy failed in the 
case of 2001-11 Libya, due to the policy not taking into account the context in which it was 
implemented. This section underlines these contextual elements which prevented the EU 
policy from being successful. 
Understanding the ethnographic makeup of Libya is key to identifying why the EU’s peace-
through-trade-policy failed between 2001 and 2011, and why it caused continuing bouts of 
conflict and barriers to peace. The territory which is recognized as present day Libya is 
made up of the three former Ottoman provinces; Cyrenaica in the east, Tripolitania in the 
north-west and Fezzan in the south-west.49 Vandewalle notes how the aggregation of these 
provinces led to a sense of statelessness in the country as an affinity to ‘an earlier form of 
political community – family and tribe’ still resonates in modern day Libya.50 This was the 
case during the 1911-50 Italian occupation,51 the 1951-69 King Idris Al-Sanussi monarchy,52 
as well as the 1969-2011 Gaddafi era. 
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This sense of statelessness and the subsequent fissures in society was compounded by the 
management of hydrocarbons in Libya, especially under Gaddafi’s rule. Initially, the sector’s 
importance first rose in 194753 when the US oil company, Esso Standard, carried out a 
Libyan expedition and denoted that there was a ‘good’ chance of discovering commercial 
quantities of oil in the country.54 At this point, the majority of discovered oil was located in the 
Sirte Basin, straddling the Tripolitania and Cyrenaica provinces. 55  The discovery of oil 
drastically changed the economic and political landscape of the country. Indeed, under King 
Idris oil production jumped from 20,000 barrels per day (bpd) in 1960 to 3 million bpd (mbpd) 
in 1969.56 As a result, the wealth accrued from the resource and its distribution began to 
determine the power brokers in Libya. 
The oil exploration was carried out under the 1955 Petroleum Law, which assured private oil 
companies that tenders for discovery and extraction would be based on commercial and not 
political considerations.57 The law provided a basis for oil companies (particularly those in 
Europe which benefitted from limited transport costs compared to energy imports from the 
Gulf), to profit from the process whilst limiting the Libyan government to the role of tax 
collector.58  As a result, the energy industry was protected and run by technocrats who 
ensured that the public and private sectors profited from the resource.59 
Additionally, Gaddafi’s Third Universal Theory (TUT) which was developed in the early years 
of his rule and detailed in his Green Book, contributed to the fissures in Libyan society. The 
TUT’s first step was for Libyans to be ‘divided into Basic People’s Conferences [who then…] 
select [their] own secretariat [who then…] form [Professional] Conferences. The masses of 
the Basic People’s Conferences will then select administrative People’s Committees to 
replace government administration’.60 This in turn meant that there was a ban on political 
parties in Libya.61 As the resulting public institutions would be run by and answerable to the 
people,62 thus, any grievances could be expressed through the respective committees and 
channeled up from the local level into the municipal and national level committees. 63 
However, the oil and banking industries (and foreign policy making decisions), were the 
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exception to this revolutionary overhaul as Gaddafi maintained control over these spheres.64 
This was maintained under Gaddafi until the détente era where a series of economic and 
public reforms65 attempted to reintegrate Libya into the international community, discussed 
later. It is also worth noting how the TUT continued the trend of resisting traditional state 
structures, in the sense that public institutions did not take the traditional form of 
ministries/departments. Indeed, despite Gaddafi’s advocacy of the TUT, the leader 
demonstrated his allegiance to his own family/tribe,66 built up security forces and allies using 
oil wealth67 and according to Niblock, accrued a personal wealth estimated to be worth 
billions of US dollars in 2011.68 This meant that, as identified by Joffé, Gaddafi’s rule was 
epitomized as being fully autocratic, and therefore ‘radical political change [in the 2011 
Revolution context] could only result in civil war’.69 Indeed, as identified in the main body of 
this paper, this particular context of the Libyan regime ‘type’ was also a factor which was not 
given enough attention in EU policy towards Libya. 
Furthermore, US pressure to isolate Libya also impacted EU-Libyan ties. Indeed, as 
determined by Chorin, America labeled Libya a ‘potential US enem[y]’ in 1977 and invoked 
an oil embargo five years later.70 However, as Vandewalle notes, US aims to isolate Libya 
were met with a European reluctance to implement sanctions against the Middle Eastern 
state.71 This US pressure came in an era when Libya was supporting terrorist activities, 
specifically the 1986 Berlin night club,72 the 1988 Lockerbie Pan Am flight73 and the 1989 
Niger UTA (a French company) flight bombings, for which the country accepted 
responsibility.74 However, despite Libya accepting responsibility for these bombings, Europe 
provided limited support for the US sanctions and ‘especially for the use of military force’.75 
This support for international terrorism did however result in the 1993 United Nations (UN) 
sanction freezing financial transactions with Libya,76 which was then suspended under the 
1998 UN resolution 1192 following the handover and trial of the two Lockerbie suspects.77 
These factors, namely: the sense of statelessness, the rejection of outside influence, the 
importance of (in terms of wealth) and geographical location of energy reserves, the 
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unconventional (or lack of) state structure, the support for international terrorism, US 
pressure as well as the WMD program and ensuing sanctions all provide the context to the 
2001-11 timeframe which observed varying bouts of conflict alongside EU trade. 
WMD & Sanctions 
Libya’s WMD program and the subsequent international sanctions placed on the country had 
a detrimental impact on the EU’s peace-through-trade-policy between 2001 and 2011. This 
section details the formulation of this aspect and identifies how it presented a barrier to the 
EU’s peace-through-trade-policy in this case. 
The WMD program was instigated in 1969 after Libya signed the Nuclear non-Proliferation 
Treaty (NPT) a year earlier.78 The program, supported by the Soviet Union and weakened by 
its breakup in 1991, aimed to establish domestic legitimacy and was challenged by 
reformers, including Gaddafi’s son, Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi79 (referred to as Saif henceforth). 
Further, the ILSA was introduced in 1996 by the US Senate to force Libya to drop: 
Its support of international terrorism and its efforts to acquire WMD [as they] 
constitute a threat to international peace and security that endangers the national 
security and foreign policy interests of the US and those countries with which it 
shares common strategic and foreign policy objectives.80 
In 1996, the EU staunchly protested against the extraterritorial nature of the ILSA, 81 
something the UN also officially opposed.82 The EU also identified the ILSA as unproductive 
and a barrier to increased dialogue.83 In November 1996, the EU took a step further and 
implemented a blocking statute on the ILSA (as well as other US laws), which ultimately led 
to the 1997 EU-US agreement to allow the EU to continue to invest in Libya (and Iran).84 
This demonstrated the EU’s commitment to the peace-through-trade-policy in Libya. 
Furthermore, the handover and trial of the Lockerbie suspects led to the 1998 suspension of 
the UN sanctions. In turn, this led to an era of increased pressure on the US to lift its own 
sanctions on Libya i.e. the ILSA. Indeed, post-1998 EU firms actively sought to fill the gap in 
the Libyan market left by the US as a result of the ILSA, particularly when concerned with 
hydrocarbons (given their high quality and proximity to Europe). 85  Further, Gaddafi 
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dismantled his WMD program in 2003,86 and the US lifted the ILSA with respect to Libya in 
2006 when it was satisfied with the program’s termination status.87 
Libya’s WMD program played a pivotal role in stunting overall and EU trade with the country 
(see for example the 2001-03 period in graph 1 in the appendix). Indeed, the absence of this 
factor led to an increased EU-Libyan trade trajectory post-2003, as Libya’s relations began 
to warm with the international community. However, the country still suffered from censored 
freedom of speech, bans on political parties amid the 2003-10 era which contributed to 
sparking the 2011 conflict and continued unrest, detailed in the following sections. 
The Détente Era 
Between 2003 and 2010 Libya began to recover from previously implemented economic 
sanctions, being listed as a state sponsoring terrorism, diplomatically shunned, pursuing 
WMDs and suppressing political and public opposition to the administration, in the 
conventional sense (as mentioned earlier, the TUT ambiguously allowed for opposing voices 
to be heard). Following Gaddafi’s decision to cease WMD development, the attempts to 
integrate Libya into the international community were buoyed with EU optimism in early 2004 
that the Middle Eastern state would join the 1995/2008 EUROMED.88 
This confidence was demonstrated when Libya agreed to repay $36 million worth of debt 
(roughly 80% of the total owed) to the UK’s Export Credits Guarantee Department (ECGD) in 
January 2004, which then led the UK institution to resume their remit of providing cover for 
firms wishing to invest in the country (having been on pause since 1984).89 What followed 
was a cavalcade of private companies rushing in to sign contracts with their Libyan 
counterparts.90 Diplomatically, relations began to improve and in March 2004, the Libyan 
Foreign Minister Mohammed Shalgam visited London and met PM Tony Blair.91 
Further, prior to the dismantlement of the WMD program, France was frustrated by the fact 
that Libya had offered larger compensation packages to the Lockerbie victims than to the 
Niger victims and threatened to veto the UN notion to lift sanctions in September 2003.92 
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However, following the decision to dismantle the WMD program, France significantly ramped 
up Franco-Libyan ties by signing economic, tourism and co-operation agreements in April 
2004, which also meant that the French export credit agency provided cover for firms 
planning to invest in the country.93 
In August 2004, Libya improved its ties with Germany by providing $35 million worth of 
compensation to the families of the 1986 Berlin nightclub bomb victims.94  The German 
private sector responded by investing in Libyan oil and construction projects.95 
Diplomatically, the Italians also warmed to Libya following the WMD program dismantlement. 
Indeed, PM Silvio Berlusconi was the first Western leader to visit Libya and meet Gaddafi 
(following the WMD termination), in December 2003.96 Commercially, Italian firms invested in 
the hydrocarbon,97 defense,98 telecom99 and solar energy industries100 in Libya, before and 
after Berlusconi’s visit. 
The new EU member, Bulgaria demonstrated its intent on improving economic relations with 
Libya by waiving $56.6 million worth of arms trade debt (attained whilst the country was part 
of the USSR), after six medics from the EU member state were released from custody in 
Libya. 101  Elsewhere in Europe, Spanish, 102  Dutch 103  and Greek 104  firms also improved 
commercial ties with Libya following the dismantlement of the WMD program. 
Indeed, European governments demonstrated their commitment to increase their economic 
presence in Libya by the fact that European-Libyan oil and gas contracts outnumbered those 
of the US.105 The European Commission (EC) also extended its $1.2 million worth of grants 
to Libya in 2005.106 From 1998 to 2007, foreign investment in Libya hit an estimated $19.8 
billion with the lions share ($15.2 billion) coming from Europe.107 Examples of this came in 
the form of European firms, acting in various consortiums and investing in the oil, 108 
telecom109 and transport industries110 in Libya. This was made possible by the EU member 
states actively seeking investments in Libya at this point.111 
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Even Libya’s harshest critic, the US permitted Libyan companies to apply for export credit 
allowances, and exports of agricultural products to Libya were supported by the US 
government in 2004.112 Further, by May 2006, US-Libyan diplomatic and economic ties had 
essentially resumed for the first time in nearly three decades. 
In the nuclear field, Libya’s National Bureau for Research and Development (NBRD) signed 
an MoU with Ariva of France in February 2007 to work together to explore for uranium for 
civilian aims.113 Further, in July 2004, ‘World Trade Organization (WTO) members agreed to 
start talks with Libya on its membership bid,’ which meant it became an observer of the 
organization.114 
Each of these examples demonstrated how the international community and specifically, 
Europeans warmed to Libya following the suspension of its WMD program. Furthermore, the 
numerous economic transactions also demonstrated the EU’s confidence in the peace-
through-trade-policy. This was complemented by the fact that the ENP and EUROMED were 
implemented in this timeframe. However, as mentioned earlier, Libya was not fully integrated 
into these two instruments which ran alongside the EU peace-through-trade provisions. The 
result of each of these developments was a failure of the EU’s peace-through-trade-policy in 
this timeframe. 
Attempts at Reform 
The economic reforms which swept the country in the 2003-10 period demonstrated Libya’s 
attempts to entice foreign investment after years of being an international community outlier. 
Indeed, prior to the end of the WMD program, Gaddafi continued to ring fence the oil sector 
by denoting that the industry ‘can assign any foreign expert to run these [oil] companies in a 
way to guarantee the promotion of the oil industry’,115 this was something which caused 
concern to foreign investors.116 Upon his arrival, the new PM Shukri Ghanem, appointed in 
June 2003 with the task of reforming the economy, noted that the administration had ‘already 
been working to open up a number of areas in the hydrocarbons sector’.117  Ghanem’s 
administration also unified the Libyan Dinar currency exchange rate, combining the 
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commercial rate for foreign currency use and an official rate for national use.118 Additionally, 
Ghanem noted that a new law was introduced to ensure that ‘foreign firms will be obliged to 
employ more Libyans than foreigners and to re-evaluate salaries for all employees’.119 
Concurrently, Saif also emphasized the need to integrate the country into the international 
community by announcing in October 2004 that ‘there is a new beginning between Libya and 
the West. Now we are talking about reforms and modernization, but we have to understand 
the goals, aims and timing, otherwise we will repeat the mistakes of others’.120 Saif also 
noted in 2007 that ‘the next challenge for Libya is to draft a package of laws which you can 
call a constitution, but they must be endorsed by the people to become a contract between 
the people’.121 Each of these examples demonstrated the need and desire to include Libyans 
in the political structure of the country by updating the TUT. This impetus also 
complemented the EU’s peace-through-trade-policy. 
Despite these calls for reform, the impotence of these schemes were heavily criticized. An 
example of this was clear when the UK ambassador to Libya, Anthony Layden, noted 2004: 
Since January, I have the impression that enthusiasm for economic reform has 
lessened […] I do not know why. Perhaps after 35 years the people involved are not 
happy to let go and let the state shrink back to a planning and regulatory role […] I 
find it hard to explain.122 
Layden’s comments also demonstrated the continued statelessness mentality, as well as 
taking actions (albeit through inaction), which point to precedence being given to family/tribe 
loyalties as opposed to a central government. These concerns were exacerbated when 
Ghanem was charged with reforming the National Oil Corporation (NOC) and removed from 
the post of PM.123 
However, there were signs of promise when Ghanem’s successor, Baghdadi Al-Mahmoudi 
launched the country’s Economic Development Board and the Libyan Investment Company 
in February 2007 to induce investment and create an attractive business environment.124 
This also coincided with the launch of the country’s first Private Equity fund by a US firm in 
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January 2007,125 as well as an economic reform package which saw local entrepreneurs 
being offered similar incentives to those of foreign investors coming into place.126 
However, despite these positive signs of reform and the liberalizing of the economy which 
complemented the EU’s peace-through-trade-policy agenda (in the sense that more trade 
was able to be carried out), since the start of 2006, the Libyan government had shut down 
the overseas arms of the energy sector’s state-controlled procurement process. This meant 
that international companies dealing with transactions in the Hydrocarbons sector had to 
deal directly with the NOC, which as noted by St John resulted in ‘a process which lacked 
transparency and often delayed agreement’.127 
Gaddafi’s July 2010 aim to stick to the post-recession budget which was set to transform the 
country into ‘an economic powerhouse by 2020,’ by providing $500 billion for new projects in 
Libya,128 showed positive signs for the economic health of the country. However, politically at 
this point, EU-Libyan ties were strained following Gaddafi’s rule to stop issuing entry visas to 
citizens from the 22 EU Schengen area countries, in a reaction to the Swiss vote to ban the 
building of minarets in Switzerland.129 
Protests had been taking place in Libya throughout this period and were typified by the 
February 2009 Zawiya protests by minorities and foreign workers. What this demonstrated 
was how the fissures in Libyan society, which were exacerbated by Vandewalle’s sense of 
statelessness, continued to act as a barrier to the EU’s peace-through-trade-policy in the 
timeframe concerned. 
The 2011 Conflict, Sanctions & Unrest 
Libya’s experience of the regional protests and revolutions turned violent in February 2011 
when security forces fired on protestors in the Fezzan, Tripolitania and Cyrenaica provinces. 
The 2011 EU-Libya Framework agreement which aimed to increase both political and 
economic ties was suspended in February 2011. On 26 February, the UN imposed 
resolution 1970 and referred the situation to the International Criminal Court (ICC), imposed 
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an arms, asset and travel ban on members of the administration (including Gaddafi and 
Saif).130  The implementation of this led to private investor contractors withdrawing from 
Libya.131 
On 17 March, the military intervention, under UN resolution 1973,132 had a significant impact 
on trade in the country. Indeed, the intervention (along with the underlying sense of 
statelessness) raised the prospect of a divided Libya. The potential of such a division, which 
had led to the dwindling of oil production in the country following the sanctions being put in 
place, led Peter Manoogian, the former BP head in the country, to note: 
The oil is mainly on the eastern side, so if the rebels get that that's one thing. But it's 
hard to see how that could be sustained. Some countries would be in a very difficult 
position, especially Italy, where the export pipelines go. It would have to recognize 
the East, as well as the West.133 
Furthermore, the US and EU blacklisting of companies in Libya meant that business tailed 
off during the conflict.134 The sanctions and damage accrued to the oil sector by the fighting 
effectively shut down Libya’s oil sector which made up around 70% of revenues in July 2011. 
This was a result of the developments in the same month which saw rebels holding 
Benghazi (east of the Sirte oil fields) and the transport network along which the export and 
refinery hubs were located was also being held by the rebels in the east.135 By the end of 
2011, oil production was reported at effectively zero,136 down from 1.80 mbpd in 2010.137  
In the aftermath of the capture and killing Gaddafi, contractors found it difficult to resume 
work in the country as the legal basis for their contracts were being checked meticulously by 
the National Transitional Council (NTC),138 the body recognized as the legal representation 
of Libya following the September 2011 UN resolution 2009, which established the United 
Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) to help with the transition and partially lifted 
arms, finance (including frozen NOC assets) and travel bans.139 This was also followed by 
resolutions; lifting the no fly zone (resolution 2016), removing (resolution 2017) and 
reaffirming the removal of chemical and arms proliferation concerns (resolution 2022), from 
September to December 2011.140 
  
19 
The conflict and ensuing sanctions in Libya also provided a barrier to the success of the 
EU’s peace-through-trade-policy. Indeed, each of these developments underlined the nature 
of the Libyan state which was lacking a conventional structure under Gaddafi, and as 
identified by Brahimi, initially it was the NTC’s task to ensure its legitimacy in Libya by 
tackling these issues. 141  A tall order for what was the newly formed acting Libyan 
government. 
Conclusions 
This paper demonstrates how the EU’s peace-through-trade-policy failed in the case of Libya 
between 2001 and 2011. The policy, which is rooted in EU Treaty provisions was unable to 
maintain peace in Libya as the continued suppression of speech and political parties and the 
2011 conflict all took place alongside rising EU-Libyan trade levels. 
The main reason for the failure of the EU’s peace-through-trade-policy in Libya was due to 
the EU not accounting for the political and economic environment in which the policy was 
implemented. Specifically, this paper identifies the following factors contributing to this: the 
statelessness ethos, an unconventional, if not dissolved (under Gaddafi) state structure, the 
WMD program and its induced sanctions, the 2011 conflict, and the location and abundance 
of hydrocarbons and their relationship with the economy. It is also important to note that the 
EU member states’ bilateral ties with Libya undermined a united EU approach to the Middle 
Eastern state. 
From the EU perspective, it was clear that the EU member states’ public and private 
commercial interests outweighed the peace-through-trade political goals. It is therefore 
necessary for the EU to ensure that it takes into account the political and economic 
environment in which it implements the peace-through-trade-policy. As a result, the EU has 
two options which are interrelated; firstly, to adopt a policy which concentrates on state 
building and increasing interactions between the different facets of Libya’s society. This 
would require the EU attaching conditions to its trade deals with Libya, i.e. to allow a 
presence and active EU role in the county, which would lead to a better understanding of the 
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context, history and reasons for the peace-through-trade-policy failure. The problem with this 
route is that it incorporates a sense of external intervention, something, as pointed out in this 
paper, which led to the failure of the peace-through-trade-policy between 2001 and 2011. 
Secondly, to adopt the peace-through-trade-policy in an absolute sense, i.e. to permanently 
suspend trade (including private) transactions until the internal actors in Libya reach an 
agreement/peaceful solution. This would lead to a short-term loss for both the EU and Libya, 
as well as have a negative impact on the Middle Eastern state’s economic wellbeing. 
However, the long-term benefits of an agreed peaceful solution, without the influence of an 
outside actor (the EU in this case) would be closer to being achieved. This would also lead 
to the problem of Libya seeking alternative trade partners whom operate without the liberal 
democratic conditions of human rights standards, freedom of expression, abandoning 
support for terrorist organizations and an open economy. Nevertheless, with the EU having 
made up 70% of Libya’s total trade in 2010,142 Brussels has the leverage to apply this policy 
and in doing so would be executing its peace-through-trade-policy in its truest sense. 
Additionally, following the 2010-11 initiated revolutionary wave across the Middle East and 
the subsequent unrest, it is more important than ever that the EU’s peace-through-trade-
policy takes into account the context in which it is being implemented. Indeed, it is only when 
a nuanced understanding of the different countries and contexts is accounted for in the EU’s 
dealings with the region, that the underlying causes and drivers of conflict and barriers to 
peace can be understood and broken down, respectively. 
Finally, even if the EU members were more united in their adoption of the peace-through-
trade-policy, unless these factors were understood and accounted for, the policy would still 
face the same issues. Moreover, a recalibration of the peace-through-trade-policy is required 
for the EU to be successful in the future, either that, or a removal of the peace-through-
trade-policy and rhetoric all together. 
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APPENDIX 
Graph 1: EU-Libyan Political Economy (2000-2012) 
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2000 2.58 13.08 0.92 2.38 12.08 3.73 13.38 
2001 3.05 11.60 0.90 2.73 10.39 4.40 11.01 
2002 3.24 9.52 0.95 3.06 9.00 4.40 9.80 
2003 3.21 11.00 1.13 3.63 12.44 4.33 14.65 
2004 3.54 13.67 1.24 4.40 17.01 6.33 20.41 
2005 3.59 19.81 1.24 4.47 24.65 6.08 31.36 
2006 3.68 26.07 1.26 4.62 32.73 6.04 40.26 
2007 4.22 27.36 1.37 5.78 37.50 6.73 46.97 
2008 5.84 35.31 1.47 8.58 51.93 9.15 62.10 
2009 6.48 20.87 1.39 9.04 29.11 12.86 36.95 
2010 7.09 29.23 1.33 9.40 38.75 17.67 48.67 
2011 2.09 10.44 1.39 2.91 14.54 8.00 18.00 
2012 6.38 32.77 1.28 8.19 42.10 23.00 59.00 
Sources: EC, ‘Statistics Database’, ECB, ‘Statistical Data Warehouse’ and WB, ‘WDI’. 
 
